Post by account_disabled on Jan 29, 2024 7:22:53 GMT
The Christian Democracy (PDC), which conditioned its votes on a political agreement that consisted of a constitutional reform and a Statute of Democratic Guarantees. Part of the PDC and the PS were opposed to any agreement, for naturally opposite reasons. Allende assumed the government without a parliamentary majority , and the Christian Democrats, although they had been decisive in bringing the Socialists to power, soon began to exert tough opposition. The moral lesson of President Allende CIA SABOTAGE In 1999, the publication of CIA documents confirmed the intense illegal activity of the US secret services to destabilize the Allende government . The first American covert action was the assassination of the then head of the Army, General René Schneider, with the unsuccessful objective of establishing chaos and preventing Allende's takeover.
He later financed far-right terrorist groups such as Patria y Libertad and gave direct support to the military coup of 1973 and the dictatorship that followed it. In the economic field, between 1970 and 1973, Richard Nixon's Phone Number Database government ordered the suspension of loans to Chile and sought to sabotage the Chilean economy by artificially depressing the price of copper – the country's main export product – in the world market. And he sponsored large strikes by truckers and industries that plunged the country into chaos. The political labyrinth in which Allende had to navigate had as a strong aggravating factor the lack of support from sectors of the UP itself. In January 1970, when the Executive Committee of the Socialist Party voted on the presidential candidacy, Allende obtained 13 votes, but there were 14 abstentions.
His position within the PS was a minority and he had to accept that the decisions would be adopted unanimously by the parties that made up the UP, which obviously became an obstacle to taking any measure. With an aggravating factor, the general secretary of the PS, Carlos Altamirano, behaved more like an adversary than as part of the government. The socialists opposed, for example, any attempt at dialogue with Christian democracy, defended by Allende as a way to make his weakened mandate politically viable. Allende had to balance between those who wanted a break and those who demanded prudence, such as the Communist Party and the moderate sector of the MAPU. Three years before the election, the PS had approved in its congress a document that said the opposite of what Allende defended: “Revolutionary violence is inevitable and legitimate (…).
He later financed far-right terrorist groups such as Patria y Libertad and gave direct support to the military coup of 1973 and the dictatorship that followed it. In the economic field, between 1970 and 1973, Richard Nixon's Phone Number Database government ordered the suspension of loans to Chile and sought to sabotage the Chilean economy by artificially depressing the price of copper – the country's main export product – in the world market. And he sponsored large strikes by truckers and industries that plunged the country into chaos. The political labyrinth in which Allende had to navigate had as a strong aggravating factor the lack of support from sectors of the UP itself. In January 1970, when the Executive Committee of the Socialist Party voted on the presidential candidacy, Allende obtained 13 votes, but there were 14 abstentions.
His position within the PS was a minority and he had to accept that the decisions would be adopted unanimously by the parties that made up the UP, which obviously became an obstacle to taking any measure. With an aggravating factor, the general secretary of the PS, Carlos Altamirano, behaved more like an adversary than as part of the government. The socialists opposed, for example, any attempt at dialogue with Christian democracy, defended by Allende as a way to make his weakened mandate politically viable. Allende had to balance between those who wanted a break and those who demanded prudence, such as the Communist Party and the moderate sector of the MAPU. Three years before the election, the PS had approved in its congress a document that said the opposite of what Allende defended: “Revolutionary violence is inevitable and legitimate (…).